(no subject)

[eyebeams]

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ALINE L. HINRIKSEN v. NOVIVAT INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit

Petitioner alleges that agents of Novivat Inc. retrieved spouse Francis Hinriksen for post-mortem internment before death, arguing that as resuscitation methods have been used to revive patients in similar situations as Mr. Hinriksen, lack of heart function alone is insufficient to establish death and contractual internment. Rejecting the petitioner's claim, the Ninth Circuit accepted defendant Novivat's statements that the cessation of brain activity reduced the commercial viability of the resultant product and that the internment contract explicitly requires an honest attempt at internment while the contractor's corpse adheres to ideal conditions.

Held: In entering into an internment contract Mr. Hinriksen established the definition of his own death. This is inherent to the contract; it may not be entered into without accepting this consequence. Other citizens fall under a medical practitioner's duty of care even after heart function ceases (but before other lifesaving options have exhausted themselves) but internment contractors are property, not persons, at the moment heart function ceases. The existence of any animate process is not in itself sufficient to nullify the contractual obligation. Lugosi v. United States is a clear precedent, showing that even human bodies with more varied and vigorous animate processes are not necessarily persons.